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Abstract  
In the aftermaths of World War II, a mechanism for constitutional review was set 
up, to provide the system with means of reacting against infringements of the Supreme 
Law. Even though a Constitutional Court was established, the Italian system of 
constitutional adjudication is only partially inspired by Kelsen’s centralized model: 
actually, one its main features of the system is the cooperation between the Constitutional 
Court and ordinary courts. In the last decades, major changes have increased the 
system’s rate of decentralization, in connection with European integration and, most 
notably, with the new role for ordinary courts in the context of constitutional review. In 
this regard, the Constitutional Court required ordinary courts to refrain from submitting 
a question of constitutionality until they had examined – and excluded – the possibility 
of interpreting the provision at issue so as to render it constitutional. The constitutionally 
oriented legislative interpretation can be linked to the fact that Constitution has deeply 
penetrated society and the courtrooms, to the point that currently the protection of the 
Constitution can be effectively achieved by ordinary means, so that Constitutional 
Court’s guidance is needed much less frequently than in the past.  
I. Historical Background 
The history of judicial review of legislation begins in the nineteenth 
century. At a first glance, this may be a surprising statement, since it was only 
in the aftermath of World War II that a written Constitution characterized by 
supremacy over the rest of the law came into force. However, in reality, by 
that time, the courts and legal scholarship had long been inquiring into the 
judicial review of legislation, both in Italy and in several other countries.1 
 
 Paper presented at the eleventh Italian-British Constitutional Conversation, on ‘Judicial 
Review of Legislation in Italy and the United Kingdom’, Italian Cultural Institute – London, 13 
June 2016. 
 Full Professor of Comparative Public Law, University of Pisa. Pro Tempore Scientific 
Coordinator of the Comparative Law Area, Research Service, Constitutional Court of the Italian 
Republic. The author wishes to thank Sarah Pasetto for her comments and suggestions. 
1 For instance, extensive discussion among scholars on the possibility and the opportunity to 
introduce judicial review of legislation, even though the Constitutional Acts did not provide for 
any form of review, took place in France during the Third Republic. See eg J. Barthélèmy and 
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When Italy became a unitary State, the so-called Albertine Statute, 
adopted in 1848 for the Kingdom of Sardinia, was extended to the whole 
Italian territory as its first constitution.2 The Statute defined itself as 
unamendable. Nevertheless, it was soon agreed that any act of Parliament 
could derogate from constitutional provisions. This was consistent with the 
strong influence exerted on Italian legal culture by the ideals of the French 
Revolution and Rousseau’s theory of the law (of Parliament) as the expression 
of the general will, and the subsequent conception of (parliamentary) law as 
the product of the sovereign and materialization of rationality.3 
Notwithstanding the resulting centrality of Parliament-enacted law, the 
judicial branch gradually developed a doctrine according to which legislation 
could be reviewed in procedural terms, since infringements of the Albertine 
Statute’s provisions on the legislative process could empower courts to declare 
the final act as null and void. In other words, the breach of procedural 
provisions was deemed not only to indicate the act’s unlawfulness, but – more 
radically – also to hinder its very existence from the legal point of view. Some 
scholars and judges thus stated that courts were allowed to refrain from 
applying the act solely because of their ‘duty (…) to say what the law is’4 – 
and the act was not law at all. 
The founding principle of judicial review of legislation emerged gradually, 
but was never completely implemented by the judiciary, at least in relation 
to acts of Parliament: as a matter of fact, the most significant declarations of 
invalidity involved legislation adopted by means of governmental decrees and 
were delivered at a turning point of Italian history, namely just before and at 
the dawn of the Fascist regime. The dictatorship prevented further development of 
the doctrine and froze judicial activism, in favour of a rigid judicial deference 
 
G. Jèze, ‘Pouvoir et devoir des tribunaux en général et des tribunaux roumains en particulier de 
vérifier la constitutionnalité des lois à l’occasion des procès portés devant eux’ Revue du droit 
public et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger, 138 (1912); P. Duez, ‘Le contrôle 
juridictionnel des lois en France. Comment il convient de poser la question’, in M. Hauriou ed, 
Mélanges Maurice Hauriou (Paris: Sirey, 1929), 211-249. 
2 It is noteworthy that the act was named statute precisely to avoid the name Constitution, 
which the Sardinian establishment considered too liberal. Indeed, the notion of the revolutionary 
nuance of the term Constitution was deeply entrenched in Italian liberal culture, as demonstrated 
by the definition of constitution given by Pellegrino Rossi, one of the most important figures of 
Italian liberalism; in his lectures on constitutional law in Paris during the eighteen-thirties, he 
stated that the constitution was ‘the law of free states, those which escaped the rule of privileges’: 
see P. Rossi, Cours de Droit constitutionnel professé à la Faculté de Paris, recueilli par M.A. 
Porée (Paris: Librairie du Guillaumin, 1866), I, 8 (the lectures collected were delivered in 1835-
1836 and in 1836-1837). 
3 See J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social, ou Principes du droit politique (Amsterdam: Rey, 
1762), II, Chapter VI. 
4 The words in brackets are from the opinion of the US Supreme Court in Marbury v 
Madison 5 US 137, 177 (1803). 
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towards the Executive (and political power more broadly).5 
After World War II, the legal and political reconstruction began with the 
drafting of a new Constitution, that was adopted at the end of 1947. Italian 
constitutionalism thus entered a brand new phase, marked by the 
establishment of a human-rights oriented system and in which a new wave 
of jurisprudence inspired by natural law imposed limits on the government 
and even on the legislature, which were now bound by a Constitution 
conceived as the Supreme Law of the Land. In this connection, two features 
of the new Charter must be highlighted. 
On one hand, for the first time, a genuine bill of rights was adopted to 
protect human rights from all kinds of infringement, by any type of authority: 
the only way to avoid the obligations enshrined in the Constitution was 
supposed to be through adopting constitutional amendments, for which it was 
necessary to follow a complex procedure that was practically guaranteed 
either to generate parliamentary opposition or to afford the People with the 
chance to block the majority’s illiberal initiatives.6 
On the other hand, for the first time, a mechanism for constitutional 
review was set up, to provide the system with an effective means of reacting 
against infringements of the Supreme Law. This aim was pursued by Arts 134-
137 of the Constitution, which contained the provisions on the Constitutional 
Court. Oddly enough, but perhaps not surprisingly, these articles too were 
subjected to majority filibustering, since the Court began its functions only in 
1956, ie over eight years from the Constitution’s entry into force. However, 
constitutional review preceded the Constitutional Court thanks to Clause 2 
of the VII Transitional and Final Provision of the Constitution, which 
allowed ordinary courts to decide the controversies that would ordinarily 
have been referred to the Constitutional Court.7 
 
5 Concerning attempts to establish a form of judicial review of legislation before the 
Fascist dictatorship, see F. Racioppi, ‘Il sindacato giudiziario sulla costituzionalità delle leggi’ 
La legge, 705 (1905); A. Pizzorusso, ‘Garanzie costituzionali – Article 134’, in G. Branca ed, 
Commentario della Costituzione (Bologna: Zanichelli-Il Foro italiano, 1981), 43; F. Roselli, 
‘Giudici e limiti al potere legislativo vigente lo Statuto albertino’ Rivista trimestrale di diritto e 
procedura civile, 476 (1986); J. Luther, Idee e storie di giustizia costituzionale nell’Ottocento 
(Torino: Giappichelli, 1990), 190. 
6 Unfortunately, another way would be discovered very soon: delaying the implementation of 
constitutional provisions. The use and abuse of this instrument (a kind of majority 
filibustering: see P. Calamandrei, ‘L’ostruzionismo di maggioranza’ Il ponte, 129-136, 274-281, 
433-450 (1953)) paralysed the concrete protection of many constitutional rights, especially 
social rights and rights to equality, for a long time, such that several constitutional provisions 
were implemented only in the nineteen-seventies. 
7 Cf P. Costanzo, ‘Disposizioni transitorie e finali I-XVIII. Leggi costituzionali e di revisione 
costituzionale (1948–1993) – Disp. trans. VII’, in G. Branca and A. Pizzorusso eds, Commentario 
della Costituzione (Bologna: Zanichelli-Il Foro italiano, 1995), 143; M. Bignami, Costituzione 
flessibile, Costituzione rigida e controllo di costituzionalità in Italia (1848-1956) (Milano: 
Giuffrè, 1997); A. Simoncini, ‘L’avvio della Corte costituzionale e gli strumenti per la definizione 
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II. The Establishment of a System of Judicial Review of Legislation 
The history of the drafting of the Constitution, and in particular the 
debates held within the Constituent Assembly reveal a variety of attitudes 
towards the establishment of a system of constitutional adjudication. On one 
hand, a considerable part of the Assembly’s members, especially to the 
political left, challenged the very idea of a body endowed with the power to 
review legislation; on the other hand, proponents of judicial review were 
divided between a minority that advocated for the adoption of a decentralized 
system based on the American model and a majority that favoured the 
establishment of a specialized body. 
The latter solution was eventually chosen, also due to its vagueness: the 
establishment of a wholly new body meant that it was not necessary to 
determine whether it should be a real court or a sort of political body. This 
vagueness made the solution acceptable, at least as a lesser evil, even to left-
wing parties. 
Debates on the nature of the body to be established clearly reflected 
Hans Kelsen’s idea that the power to review legislation was best allocated to 
a body that fell within neither the legislature nor the judiciary, and that was 
autonomous from any other power:8  
‘the protection of constitutional principles (should) be performed by 
a body that, although independent from Parliament, considers laws not 
only from the perspective of citizens’ individual rights, but that shares at 
the same the legislature’s approach, without ever neglecting the “political 
point of view”; a body ultimately located in an intermediate position 
between primary legislation’s opposing needs for constitutionality and 
legitimate authority’.9 
 
del suo ruolo: un problema storico aperto’ Giurisprudenza costituzionale, 3065 (2004); U. De 
Siervo, ‘L’istituzione della Corte costituzionale: dall’Assemblea costituente ai primi anni di attività 
della Corte’, in P. Carnevale and C. Colapietro eds, La giustizia costituzionale fra memoria e 
prospettive: a cinquant’anni dalla pubblicazione della prima sentenza della Corte costituzionale 
(Torino: Giappichelli, 2008), 55. 
8 See H. Kelsen, ‘La Garantie juridictionnelle de la constitution (La Justice constitutionnelle)’ 
Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger, 197 (1928) (especially 
para IV). 
9 See C. Mezzanotte, Il giudizio sulle leggi. Le ideologie del Costituente (Napoli: Editoriale 
Scientifica, 2014), 75. With regard to the drafting of constitutional provisions concerning the 
Constitutional Court, see, moreover, G. D’Orazio, La genesi della Corte costituzionale. Ideologia, 
politica, dibattito dottrinale: un saggio di storia delle istituzioni (Milano: Giuffrè, 1981); G. 
Ferrari, ‘La difficile nascita della Corte costituzionale’ 81-82 Studi parlamentari e di politica 
costituzionale, 5 (1988); P. Costanzo, ‘L’organizzazione e il funzionamento della Corte 
costituzionale nei lavori preparatori dell’assemblea costituente’, in P. Costanzo ed, 
L’organizzazione e il funzionamento della Corte costituzionale. Atti del Convegno di Imperia, 
12-13 maggio 1995 (Torino: Giappichelli, 1996), 7; C. Margiotta Broglio, ‘La Corte costituzionale 
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The search for balance within the Court is certainly represented well: 
first, by the constitutional provisions on the Constitutional Court’s composition. 
According to these, the Court is a body whose members’ legal skills are 
accompanied with an ability to grasp the political contexts in which legislation 
is adopted and is reviewed. The need to ensure the legal qualification of the 
Court’s members results in rather strict conditions:  
‘(t)he judges of the Constitutional Courts shall be chosen from 
among judges, including those retired, of the ordinary and administrative 
higher Courts, university full professors of law and lawyers with at least 
twenty years practice’ (Art 135, para 2 of the Constitution).  
The diversity of approaches to law thus guaranteed is enhanced by the 
authorities endowed with the power to appoint or elect members:  
‘(t)he Constitutional Court shall be composed of fifteen judges, a 
third nominated by the President of the Republic, a third by Parliament 
in joint sitting and a third by the ordinary and administrative supreme 
Courts’ (Art 135, para 1). 
Second, the refusal to establish a body that risked being excessively 
enmeshed in politics and, at the same time, the need to ensure its relative 
distance from ordinary courts appears in the provisions on the powers 
entrusted to the Court. 
The Constitutional Court wields two kinds of power: the power to decide 
special constitutional controversies, and the power to perform constitutional 
review of legislation. 
The special controversies are those that arise from the distribution of 
power among the supreme bodies of the State, or between the central State 
and the Regions (Art 134, para 2, of the Constitution). The Constitutional 
Court also has the power to decide whether a referendum can be held, 
depending on whether its object falls within the domain determined by Art 
75 of the Constitution. Finally, the Court decides on charges of high treason 
or attempts to subvert the constitutional order brought against the President 
of the Republic (Art 90 of the Constitution; before 1989, the same power was 
also wielded in relation to ministers). From a comparative point of view, it 
could be noted that the Italian Court was not endowed with many accessory 
competences: for instance, the Court – unlike many other European 
Constitutional Courts – does not have any say as far as elections are concerned. 
 
italiana e il modello kelseniano’ Quaderni costituzionali, 333 (2000); G. Volpe, ‘L’accesso alla 
giustizia costituzionale: le origini di un modello’, in R. Romboli ed, L’accesso alla giustizia 
costituzionale: caratteri, limiti, prospettive di un modello (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 
2006), 3; G. Bisogni, Teoria giuridica e giustizia costituzionale in Italia. Un profilo storico-
filosofico (Milano: Mimesis, 2012). 
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Notwithstanding its original hybrid (or rather, vague) nature, the Court 
soon identified itself as a judicial body, whose peculiar responsibilities 
prevented its straightforward inclusion in the system of courts. Therefore, 
one could conclude, on this point, that the Constitutional Court is a judicial 
body, that is separate from the other courts due to its powers and its means 
of adjudicating, which does not fail to take into account the political impact 
of its judgments.10 
 
 
III. A Weakly Centralized System 
The definition of a centralized model might suggest that its adoption 
sought to establish a sort of monopoly over the review of legislation. Actually, 
it is fair to state that one of the main features of the Italian system of 
constitutional adjudication is, rather, the cooperation between the 
Constitutional Court and ordinary courts11 in performing the functions that a 
constitutional court generally carries out in a centralized model. 
The coexistence of a monopoly and a cooperation within a centralized 
model clearly requires to provide some clarifications. The main need is to 
clarify in general terms the notion of centralized. Later, it will be possible to 
identify the most significant features of the Italian system. 
 
1. The Features of a Centralized System 
In Hans Kelsen’s view, the opposite of the American decentralized 
model consisted in a specialized court that adjudicated special cases on the 
basis of special appeals lodged by special (political) authorities, without any 
connection with the actual implementation of the contested provisions 
(these features identified the so-called abstract review). Constitutional justice 
was thus conceived as being completely separate from ordinary justice.12 A 
 
10 A detailed analysis of the establishment, the role, and the powers of the Constitutional 
Court is now available in English: see V. Barsotti, P.G. Carrozza et al, Italian Constitutional 
Justice in Global Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
11 The Italian judiciary consists of various kinds of courts and magistrates. The ordinary 
judiciary is established and regulated by the law governing the judicial system (ie Arts 101-104 
of the Constitution and regio decreto 30 January 1941 no 12). According to Art 102 of the 
Constitution, ‘(e)xtraordinary or special courts may not be established. Only specialized sections 
for specific matters within the ordinary judicial bodies may be established, and these sections 
may include the participation of qualified citizens who are not members of the Judiciary’. 
However, a limited number of special courts does exist. These are the administrative courts, 
the Court of Auditors, and military tribunals. Hereinafter, the term ordinary will also refer to 
special judges and courts: in particular, it will not be used in a technical sense, but rather to 
designate any court that decides common cases, as opposed to the constitutional cases 
adjudicated upon by the Constitutional Court. 
12 As a matter of fact, Kelsen strongly criticized the Austrian constitutional reform of 1929 
that introduced review of legislation by means of judicial reference to the Constitutional Court: 
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system in which these features exist perfectly matches the Kelsenian model 
of constitutional adjudication.13 
The reference to Kelsen’s model becomes much more complicated when 
the constitutionality of legislative acts is or must be contested via ordinary 
courts. This occurs when the latter are empowered to refer to the Constitutional 
Court their doubts as to the consistency with the Constitution of a legislative 
provision that should be applied in proceedings before them. Such preliminary 
reference proceedings constitute the basis for a concrete review, because 
when the Constitutional Court reviews legislation, it cannot neglect the case 
from which the judicial proceeding originated and, eventually, the 
constitutional review requested. 
In concrete review, the notion of monopoly appears to fade, for the 
simple reason that if the legislation is to be reviewed, the ordinary courts 
and the Constitutional Court must cooperate: without the activity of the 
former, the latter could not be accessed. The preliminary reference is in itself 
a review, since only if the ordinary court suspects of an inconsistency between 
the Constitution and legislation can there be scope for the Constitutional 
Court to adjudicate. Thus, two different reviews are necessary: the first aims 
to establish whether the conditions for accessing the Constitutional Court are 
met; the second is that which may result in a declaration of unconstitutionality. 
If there still is any monopoly on part of the Constitutional Court, this certainly 
does not lie in its power to review, but rather in its power to strike down 
legislation with general effects (ie with a judgment that affects the legal order 
as a whole, and not only the parties to the case). 
Nevertheless, the monopoly over the power to strike down legislation 
can hardly ensure, per se, an effective centralization of the system. Insofar 
as ordinary courts have the exclusive power to decide whether to make a 
reference to the Constitutional Court, their first-stage decentralized review 
easily prevents any centralized review, and consequently neutralizes the 
 
H. Kelsen, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation. A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the American 
Constitution’ 2 The Journal of Politics, 183 (1942). 
13 Comparing patterns of constitutional adjudication is one of the most important topics 
of comparative constitutional law. Traditional approaches all tend to draw a clear distinction 
between the American model and the European (or Kelsenian) model. See, eg, M. Cappelletti, 
Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merril, 1971); F. Rubio 
Llorente, ‘Constitutional Jurisdiction as Law-Making’, in A. Pizzorusso ed, Law in the Making. 
A Comparative Survey (Assago-Milano: Springer-Verlang, 1988), 156. See also A. Pizzorusso, 
‘I sistemi di giustizia costituzionale: dai modelli alla prassi’ Quaderni costituzionali, 521 (1982); 
L. Favoreu, Les Cours constitutionnelles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2nd ed, 1992). 
More recently, different approaches have emerged that focus on different models: see, for 
instance, S. Gardbaum, ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’ 49 American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 707 (2001); M.V. Tushnet, ‘New Forms of Judicial Review and 
the Persistence of Rights – And Democracy-Based Worries’ 38 Wake Forest Law Review, 813 
(2003); Id, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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power to strike down legislation.14 
Hence, a major defining feature of a centralized system addresses the 
powers of the Constitutional Court to react to such a neutralization. In theory, 
judicial decisions concerning references can be appealed to a superior court 
(although there can obviously be no appeals against decisions by supreme 
courts); they can also be the subject of a direct appeal lodged by one of the 
parties with the Constitutional Court. In these two cases, the degree of 
centralization changes considerably, since only a direct appeal before the 
Constitutional Court endows it with the power to influence judicial activity 
related to the review of legislation; the appeals before the superior courts 
leave the Constitutional Court aside, thereby depriving it of the power to 
have a say on the constitutional matter concerned. 
These features demonstrate that the notion of centralized system of 
judicial review of legislation is far from being an all-of-nothing alternative to 
American decentralization: actually, several degrees of centralization are 
possible, according to the kinds of appeals that can be brought before the 
Constitutional Court and to its powers to concentrate decisions concerning 
constitutional matters. 
 
2. The Distinctive Features of the Italian System 
Even at a first glance, it is plain that in Italy, the choice for a centralized 
model of constitutional adjudication did not lead to a real monopoly for the 
Constitutional Court over the review of legislation. Several features of the 
system suggest that the Constituent Assembly opted for a system that could 
be described as a weakly centralized one. 
 
a) A Centralized Review only for Primary Legislation 
A first distinction must be drawn between primary and subordinate 
legislation, since only primary legislation can be subject to centralized review. 
The Constitutional Court is empowered to review all legislative acts, 
both national and Regional, and governmental decrees that have the same 
force as parliamentary legislation either by virtue of a delegation of power 
from the Parliament to the executive (Art 76 of the Constitution) or because 
an emergency that requires immediately-effective provisions has arisen (Art 
77 of the Constitution). 
The power to review primary legislation is not limited to acts adopted 
after the Constitution entered into force. Contrary to the German and the 
Spanish Constitutional Courts, which denied that they had any power to 
strike down legislation adopted prior to the Constitution, and thus allowed 
 
14 How such a neutralization could take place is a key issue which will be explored further 
below (para IV no 2 and para V). 
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ordinary courts to refrain from applying legislation that was inconsistent 
with the subsequently issued Constitution, the Italian Court opted for a 
centralized review of all primary legislation from its very first judgment, 
emphasizing the supremacy of the Constitution (assuming that this required 
the intervention of its guardian) instead of the application of the principle 
according to which lex posterior derogat priori.15 
When it comes to subordinate legislation, however, the Constitutional 
Court does not exercise any competence: the consistency of this category of 
measures with (the Constitution and) primary legislation is ascertained by 
ordinary courts; these have the power to refuse to apply inconsistent 
measures, while administrative courts may also strike them down, and thus 
achieve general effects for their declarations. 
 
b) An Abstract Review Confined to State v Regions Disputes 
As for review of primary legislation, two main ways to access the 
Constitutional Court were established. 
One of the two forms of judicial review of legislation provided by Italian 
law is clearly inspired by the Kelsenian model: the abstract review, which 
addresses either appeals from the national government against a Regional 
legislative act or appeals lodged by a Region against a national legislative act. 
Complaints must be filed within sixty days following the publication of the 
challenged act(s). In these cases, the Court decides – in principle – without 
referring at all to the concrete implementation of legislative provisions, even 
though the submission of a complaint does not paralyze the implementation 
of questioned provisions, so that these may have already produced effects 
when the Court reviews them.16 In these cases, the constitutional proceedings 
are designed to resolve disputes on the limits of the central State’s and 
Regions’ respective powers; the Court therefore either protects the autonomy 
of the Regions from encroachment by the central government, or protects 
the State’s legislative power against misuse of power by Regional legislatures.17 
 
15 See Corte costituzionale 14 June 1956 no 1, available at http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni 
/1956/0001s-56.html (last visited 6 December 2016). 
16 This statement is true for complaints that fall under the 2001 constitutional reform. 
Previously, the review of provisions already in force was conceivable only for national primary 
legislation, since Regional legislation was challenged before the promulgation of the President 
of the Region, such that the law-making process was suspended and the Act could enter into 
force only after the Court had decided on its consistency with the Constitution. On this subject, 
see C. Padula, L’asimmetria nel giudizio in via principale. La posizione dello Stato e delle 
Regioni davanti alla Corte costituzionale (Padova: Cedam, 2006); in French, see M. Luciani 
and P. Passaglia, ‘Autonomie régionale et locale et Constitutions – Rapport italien’ Annuaire 
international de justice constitutionnelle, 229 (2006). 
17 As a matter of fact, the national government can censure any kind of breach of the 
Constitution; thus, its claim is not necessarily related to the aim of protecting the State’s 
legislative power. 
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Although abstract review has undergone a significant evolution and a 
dramatic growth since 2003, when it comes to the number of appeals lodged 
and judgments delivered, it certainly cannot be defined as the usual way to 
access the Constitutional Court. Indeed, very few authorities have standing 
and only one of these – the national Government – is empowered to question 
the consistency of legislation with constitutional provisions: The Regions 
may only question national law with regard to the separation of legislative 
powers between the central State and the Regions. Given these limitations, 
abstract review alone would not guarantee an adequate protection of the 
Constitution. Indeed, the Italian system has been mainly characterized by 
another form of review. 
 
c) The Concrete Form of Review as the System’s Essential 
Feature 
Contrary to what Kelsenian orthodoxy would suggest, constitutional 
review can also be concrete, and, in fact, the concrete review has immediately 
become the core of the powers of the Constitutional Court, being by far the 
ordinary way to stimulate a constitutional review. The constitutionality of 
legislative acts must be invoked through the activity of ordinary (or 
administrative) courts, that are empowered to refer a question to the 
Constitutional Court when there are doubts as to the constitutionality of a 
legislative provision that should be applied in proceedings before them: 
thus, the Constitutional Court reviews the provisions’ constitutionality on 
the basis of the case in which the issue arose, such that the concrete 
implementation of the provision is one of the elements that should be 
germane to the Court’s judgment.18 
This two-step procedure creates a hybrid system, in the sense that it is 
both decentralized and centralized. It is decentralized with regard to its first 
stage, because any ordinary court, from the lowest court to the Court of 
Cassation (the Italian Supreme Court), can raise a question on the 
constitutionality of a legislative provision; without these initiatives, the 
 
18 Due to the sheer number of contributions, it is impossible to compile a complete 
bibliography on the judicial reference procedure. Among the most recent ones, see, S. Bagni, 
La questione incidentale nel controllo di costituzionalità. I sistemi italiano e spagnolo a 
confronto nel quadro dei modelli elaborati dalla dottrina (Bologna: Clueb, 2007); L. Delli 
Priscoli and P.G. Demarchi, L’eccezione di incostituzionalità: profili processuali (Bologna: 
Zanichelli, 2008); N. Pignatelli, Le ‘interazioni’ tra processo amministrativo e processo 
costituzionale in via incidentale (Torino: Giappichelli, 2008); G.L. Conti, ‘Mantenere nel tempo 
il valore del giudizio incidentale di legittimità costituzionale’, in C. Decaro et al eds, La 
“manutenzione” della giustizia costituzionale. Il giudizio sulle leggi in Italia (Torino: 
Giappichelli, 2012); A. Patroni Griffi, Accesso incidentale e legittimazione degli «organi a 
quo» (Napoli: Jovene, 2012); R. Romboli, ‘Natura incidentale del giudizio incidentale e tutela 
dei diritti: in margine alla sentenza n. 10 del 2015’ Quaderni costituzionali, 607 (2015). 
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Constitutional Court could not operate, since it has no power to initiate the 
constitutional review of legal provisions. Ordinary courts are thus the 
gatekeepers of constitutional review proceedings (this definition was 
suggested by Piero Calamandrei,19 a legal scholar who had been a Member of 
the Constituent Assembly): their task is to decide whether a question of 
constitutionality, that can be raised either by the parties to the proceedings 
or by the court itself, should be submitted to the Constitutional Court. 
Submission requires two conditions to be met: first, the court must consider 
that to decide the case, it will have to apply the legislative provision in 
question (the condition of rilevanza, ie of influence on the decision); second, 
the court must have doubts as to the consistency of the legislative provision 
with the Constitution. In other words, the court needs not be confident of the 
provision’s unconstitutionality, but simply lack certainty as to its consistency 
with the Constitution (the condition of non manifesta infondatezza; the 
referring court cannot be certain that the Constitutional Court would reject 
the question).20 
In the second stage, the procedure is characterized by a centralized 
model: the Court itself affirmed the principle of the unity of constitutional 
adjudication, which means that only one court can issue judgments on the 
constitutionality of legislation.21 More precisely, as described above, the 
Constitutional Court is the only authority empowered to strike down 
legislation: indeed, any ordinary court takes a stand on the constitutionality 
of a legislative provision, when it decides whether the conditions for 
submitting a question to the Constitutional Court have been met; the 
principle of unity of constitutional adjudication, however, implies that the 
Constitutional Court exceeds this operation, since it has the power to declare 
a provision unconstitutional, such that the provision is withdrawn and 
expelled from the legal system. The withdrawal is effective on the day after 
the judgment is published and has retrospective effect, because once the 
Court has issued a declaration of unconstitutionality the provision can no 
 
19 P. Calamandrei, La illegittimità costituzionale delle leggi nel processo civile (Padova: 
Cedam, 1950), XII. 
20 On the conditions required for submitting a question of constitutionality to the Court, 
see M. Cappelletti, La pregiudizialità costituzionale nel processo civile (Milano: Giuffrè, 1957); 
F. Pizzetti and G. Zagrebelsky, «Non manifesta infondatezza» e «rilevanza» nell’instaurazione 
incidentale del giudizio sulle leggi (Milano: Giuffrè, 1974); N. Trocker, ‘La pregiudizialità 
costituzionale’ Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, 796 (1988); F. Dal Canto, ‘La 
rilevanza e il valore del fatto nel giudizio di costituzionalità delle leggi in via incidentale’, in E. 
Malfatti, R. Romboli et al eds, Il giudizio sulle leggi e la sua “diffusione” (Torino: Giappichelli, 
2001), 145; G.P. Dolso, Giudici e Corte alle soglie del giudizio di costituzionalità (Milano: Giuffrè, 
2003); L. Azzena, La rilevanza nel sindacato di costituzionalità dalle origini alla dimensione 
europea (Napoli: Jovene, 2012). 
21 See A. Agrò, A. Cerri and F. Modugno, Il principio di unità del controllo sulle leggi nella 
giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale (Torino: Giappichelli, 5th ed, 2008). 
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longer be applied, neither to facts that may happen in the future, nor to facts 
that have already taken place but on which final judgment has not yet been 
entered. 
 
d) The Absence of a Means of Direct Appeal to the Constitutional 
Court: The Italian Separate but Equal Doctrine 
The Constituent Assembly rejected the idea of giving individuals the 
power to appeal to the Court directly. This choice had two major outcomes. 
First, the protection of individual rights and, more generally, of the 
Constitution against legislative acts was concentrated on the concrete review 
enabled by judicial references: the conditions for making the judicial reference 
the ordinary way to access the Court were therefore fulfilled. 
Second, the Constitutional Court was not endowed with the power to 
control its docket, in particular to decide whether a constitutional issue 
settled autonomously by the ordinary courts should have been settled, rather, 
only after a reference and a concrete review. This power is essential in other 
centralized systems, such as in Germany and Spain: in both of these systems, 
direct appeals lodged by individuals lie at the root of the most significant 
part of the Constitutional Courts work, and the cases brought before them 
can be considered as the response to the absence of actions to protect rights 
in ordinary courts. The contested absence of protection is the result of 
inappropriate consideration of the Constitution, that may possibly – but not 
necessarily – be demonstrated even by the refusal to refer the question of 
constitutionality regarding a legislative provision: in any case, what is 
disputed in a direct appeal to the Constitutional Court is that an issue 
concerning the respect of the Constitution was improperly decided. And 
what is relevant for the nature of the system of constitutional adjudication is 
that the Constitutional Court, while reviewing the judicial decision, and 
eventually the law that was applied in the decision, has the opportunity to 
centralize the constitutional issue, so as to supposedly decide it in the most 
appropriate way. 
The Italian Constitutional Court does not have a similar power to 
centralize: the absence of a direct appeal leaves ordinary courts free to decide, 
and – above all – to have the final say, whether to submit to the Constitutional 
Court the constitutional matter at issue and, thus, even to decide whether or 
not a review of the legislation aimed at striking it down is needed. 
Rather than a monopoly of the Constitutional Court, the judicial review 
of legislation appears to be the result of the concurrence of different courts, 
with different points of strength (and weakness): on one hand, the 
Constitutional Court can count on its monopoly to strike down a legislative 
provision or a legislative act; on the other hand, ordinary courts are 
endowed with the power to decide whether a review by the Constitutional 
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Court must take place and thus, at the end of the day, it is up to these courts 
to choose – to some extent – which of the judicial bodies will check the 
compatibility between the Constitution and the legislation. Since the 
Constitutional Court cannot do without ordinary courts and ordinary courts 
cannot do what the Constitutional Court is capable of doing (because of the 
monopoly in declaring null and void a legislative provision), a cooperation is 
required for the system to work. 
Once the cooperation defined as the cornerstone of the while system of 
judicial review, the Constitutional Court could hardly see itself as superior to 
ordinary courts. Maybe when it comes to judicial review of legislation, in 
Italy the Plessy v Ferguson doctrine still applies: as a matter of fact, the courts 
are supposed to be separate but equal.22 
From time to time, a major change in the framework of the system is 
proposed through the introduction of a remedy to give standing to individuals 
seeking to protect their constitutional rights.23 Such a reform would certainly 
enable the Constitutional Court to intervene in cases in which judicial 
references would fail. Nevertheless, the cost of these benefits would not be 
insignificant, because endowing individuals with standing for constitutional 
review leads to a massive increase in the cases to be decided. Ultimately, the 
alternative would be to accept either the protracting of constitutional 
proceedings and the consequent delay in decisions, or selectivity in deciding 
cases. The first option does not appear very attractive: the Italian 
Constitutional Court had experienced a backlog in the nineteen-eighties, and 
the reduction in the time required to decide a case that was achieved at the 
end of that decade was considered an important result for the protection of 
rights, since the principle that justice delayed is justice denied is 
unanimously shared. The second option is therefore almost necessary, but case 
selection in civil law countries is not as normal and acceptable as it may be in 
common law countries, where the practice plays an important part in the 
efficient operation of courts (the example of the US Supreme Court speaks 
for itself). On the contrary, the tradition in civil law countries tends to 
require courts to decide (all the) cases brought before them: the French 
concept of déni de justice (ie denial of justice),24 as an infringement of the 
 
22 As it is well known, Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896), is the United States Supreme 
Court decision upholding the constitutionality of state laws requiring racial segregation in public 
facilities. 
23 On these propositions, see R. Romboli, ‘La riforma dell’amparo costituzionale in Spagna e 
l’introduzione di un ricorso individuale diretto in Italia’, in G. Brunelli et al eds, Scritti in onore 
di Lorenza Carlassare (Napoli: Jovene, 2009), 1555; P. Passaglia, ‘Sull’inopportunità di 
introdurre il ricorso diretto individuale: il dibattito italiano’, in R. Tarchi ed, Patrimonio 
costituzionale europeo e tutela dei diritti fondamentali. Il ricorso diretto di costituzionalità 
(Torino: Giappichelli, 2012), 323. 
24 Art 4 of the French Civil Code of 1804 states that ‘(a) judge who refuses to give judgment 
on the pretext of legislation being silent, obscure or insufficient, may be prosecuted for being 
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fundamental right to justice, illustrates the Continental approach to the issue 
quite paradigmatically. If it is difficult to accept the introduction of individual 
constitutional appeal together with a procedure of case selection, then the 
only alternative could be to accept a de facto selection (eg by deciding minor 
cases by summary judgment), that could however lead to problems of excessive 
judicial subjectivity. 
 
 
IV. The System’s Gradual Decentralization  
The provisions regulating the Italian system of constitutional review 
have not been fundamentally amended since the nineteen-fifties.25 
Despite a rather steady legislative and constitutional regulation, the role 
and activity of the Constitutional Court have changed significantly over the 
years. On the whole, these changes have increased the system’s rate of 
decentralization, contributing to a weakening of the original option in favour 
of a basically, but partly hybrid, Kelsenian model. 
Setting aside several other factors, some changes concerning the specific 
role of the Constitutional Court as the body endowed with the power to 
review legislation must be considered. 
 
1. The Decentralized Judicial Review of Legislation Imposed 
by EU Law 
As for many other European systems, a major change for Italian 
constitutional review occurred in connection with European integration. 
With regard to the Council of Europe’s impact on the Italian legal order, over 
the years the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed a 
body of case law concerning fundamental rights that created the conditions 
for it to compete with the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, the ECtHR 
decides on the cases at issue adjudicating only with regard to possible 
breaches of individual rights; it does not review legislation. As a result, the 
competition between the national and the European Courts relates to the 
kind of protection granted to a fundamental right and the settlement of 
conflicts between opposing rights. 
When it comes to judicial review of legislation, the real rival of the 
Constitutional Court appears to be the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), that has been taking advantage of the expansion of the Union’s 
 
guilty of a denial of justice’. 
25 Nevertheless, there are some exceptions that should be mentioned. The first is the 
restriction of the criminal cases that can be brought before the Constitutional Court (since the 
constitutional reform of 1989, ministers are no longer subject to the Court’s jurisdiction). The 
second is the change introduced in 2001 regarding abstract review of Regional law; whereas 
previously this review occurred a priori, now it takes place a posteriori (see n 16 above). 
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competences, especially of the enforcement of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The latter allows the Court of Justice to develop a case 
law that has the potential to become a genuine alternative to that issued by the 
Constitutional Court, for the simple reason that the preliminary ruling 
mechanism is very similar to the internal system for referring cases to the 
Constitutional Court: indeed, judges can often choose between the two, to 
determine which (the constitutional or the European one) is more convenient 
to pursue. The dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice has 
much intensified, so that the Constitutional Court no longer enjoys a monopoly 
in interacting with ordinary courts. In other words, review of legislation takes 
place at both national and European levels: the main difference consists in the 
standards that apply: namely – and roughly – the Constitution at the national 
level, and EU primary legislation, in Luxembourg. 
The interaction between EU law and Italian law had been a very 
controversial subject for several years, until the Constitutional Court accepted, 
in 1984, the principle of primacy of what was then called Community law 
over national law.26 Since then, the situation has changed little, even though 
the 2001 reform of Art 117 of the Constitution recognized the primacy of EU 
law over national legislation through the new Clause 1, according to which: 
 ‘(l)egislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in 
compliance with the Constitution and with the constraints deriving 
from European Union law and international obligations’. 
 
26 On this subject, see, ex plurimis, P. Falzea, A. Spadaro and L. Ventura, La Corte 
costituzionale e le Corti d’Europa (Torino: Giappichelli, 2003); A. D’Atena and P. Grossi, 
Tutela dei diritti fondamentali e costituzionalismo multilivello (Milano: Giuffrè, 2004); P. 
Bilancia and E. De Marco, La tutela multilivello dei diritti (Milano: Giuffrè, 2004); N. Zanon, 
Le Corti dell’integrazione europea e la Corte costituzionale italiana (Napoli: Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane, 2006); V. Sciarabba, Tra Fonti e Corti. Diritti e principi fondamentali in 
Europa: profili costituzionali e comparati degli sviluppi sovranazionali (Padova: Cedam, 
2008); P. Perlingieri, Leale collaborazione tra Corte costituzionale e Corti europee (Napoli: 
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2008); D. Butturini, La tutela dei diritti fondamentali 
nell’ordinamento costituzionale italiano ed europeo (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 
2009); T. Giovannetti, L’Europa dei giudici. La funzione giurisdizionale nell’integrazione 
comunitaria (Torino: Giappichelli, 2009); G. Martinico, L’integrazione silente. La funzione 
interpretativa della Corte di giustizia e il diritto costituzionale europeo (Napoli: Jovene, 
2009); G. De Vergottini, Oltre il dialogo tra le Corti. Giudici, diritto straniero, comparazione 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010); G. Rolla, Il sistema europeo di protezione dei diritti fondamentali 
e i rapporti tra le giurisdizioni (Milano: Giuffrè, 2010); E. Falletti and V. Piccone, Il nodo 
gordiano tra diritto nazionale e diritto europeo (Bari: Cacucci, 2012); P.L. Portaluri, L’Europa 
del diritto: i giudici e gli ordinamenti (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2012); R. Cosio 
and R. Foglia, Il diritto europeo nel dialogo delle corti (Milano: Giuffrè, 2013). In English, see 
G. Martinico and O. Pollicino, The Interaction between Europe’s Legal Systems. Judicial 
Dialogue and the Creation of Supranational Laws (Camberley Surrey: Edward Elgar, 2012). 
In French, see M. Luciani, P. Passaglia, et al, ‘Justice constitutionnelle, justice ordinaire, justice 
supranationale: à qui revient la protection des droits fondamentaux en Europe? – Rapport 
italien’ Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle, 251 (2004). 
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In Corte costituzionale 5 June 1984 no 170, the Court allowed ordinary 
courts to decide conflicts between Community law having direct effect and 
national legislation, in the sense that the latter cannot be applied if it is 
inconsistent with the former. To avoid derogating from the principle of the 
unity of constitutional justice, however, the Constitutional Court recognized 
EU law’s primacy only pragmatically, rather than theoretically: the decision 
on whether to apply national law was not to be considered as resulting from 
an illegitimacy, but simply as the consequence of judicial choice in favor of 
the special provision (the European one) over the general (national) one; the 
national provision thus still remained in force, because only EU acts 
prevented it from being applied. Thus, the Constitutional Court de facto 
granted immediate operation to the primacy of EU law, as the European 
Court of Justice had ordered in the Simmenthal judgment of 9 March 
1978;27 but the price to pay was the elimination of the Constitutional Court’s 
power to review the compatibility of national legislation with European law. 
Previously, this was conceived as a matter of constitutionality, since a breach 
of EU law meant that the legislation (also) infringed the constitutional 
provision that obliges Italian legislatures (at both national and regional levels) 
to act in conformity with European law. Before 2001, the fundamental 
constitutional provision was Art 11, according to which ‘Italy agrees, on 
conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that 
may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the 
Nations’ (European integration being perceived as establishing organizations 
that pursue such an objective); however, as mentioned above, after 2001 the 
relevant constitutional provision is Art 117, para 1. 
The Corte costituzionale 5 June 1984 no 170 marked the beginning of 
the trend of self-exclusion from European matters that led to the longstanding 
refusal to engage in any dialogue with the European Court of Justice. 
Indeed, the Constitutional Court exiled itself from the interaction between 
European and national law. This became plain when, in the nineteen-nineties, 
the Constitutional Court ordered ordinary courts to refer to it only once the 
interaction between EU and national law had been settled: if the 
compatibility between the two was at issue, ordinary courts were supposed 
to first submit the question to the Court of Justice through a reference for a 
preliminary ruling; only once the Court of Justice had decided, could the 
Constitutional Court be called upon to settle the constitutional issue.28  
The only power that the Constitutional Court reserved for itself – by 
virtue of the so-called counter-limits doctrine, the dottrina dei controlimiti 
 
27 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, [1978] 
ECR 629. 
28 See, in particular, Corte costituzionale 29 December 1995 no 536, Giustizia civile, I, 
930 (1996), which has been repeatedly followed so far. 
421                    The Italian Law Journal        [Vol. 02 – No. 02 
  
– was that to review the compatibility of European law with the supreme 
principles of the Italian legal order and inalienable individual rights,29 
thereby expressing a position that is not too different from that adopted by 
the German Federal Constitutional Court with the Solange I doctrine. Unlike 
the evolution experienced by German case law, however, in Italy the doctrine 
has not changed, so far. Still, it was merely a theoretical reservation, since it 
is difficult to imagine the Italian Constitutional Court declaring an EU act to 
be inconsistent with inalienable rights. Indeed, since the counter-limits doctrine 
was established, the Court has never applied it in practice. 
The refusal to participate in European judicial integration was confirmed 
for a long time by the attitude towards references for preliminary rulings. 
The Constitutional Court considered itself to not be in the position to make 
such references, since it could not be conceived as a judge in the sense 
envisaged by the EC Treaty. The idea was that if a conflict between European 
and national law existed, it was not for the Constitutional Court to request 
the Court of Justice to settle it: the doctrine imposing an obligation on 
ordinary courts to settle the question before submitting a constitutional 
reference released the Constitutional Court from having to defer to the 
Luxembourg Court. This reasoning held as long as the Constitutional Court 
had to decide a judicial reference, but the problem persisted in cases of 
abstract review, because there was no judge (and thus no institution 
empowered to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling) 
that could take part in the proceedings, and the Constitutional Court’s self-
exclusion could not be remedied by other courts. 
Taking these problems into consideration, the Constitutional Court 
eventually changed its attitude with others judgments (Corte costituzionale 
15 April 2008 no 102 and no 103), at least as far as abstract constitutional 
review is concerned. The Court accepted to define itself as a judge in the 
sense envisaged by the Treaty on European Union, so that it is empowered 
(or rather, obliged – with the exception carved out by the acte clair doctrine 
–, since it is the only jurisdiction that can take part in the proceedings) to 
submit a reference for a preliminary ruling. This is a very important step 
towards a more cooperative attitude in European matters, and the best 
indication yet that the Constitutional Court has finally agreed to engage in 
dialogue with the European Court of Justice and transcended its traditional 
conception of the separation of the EU and national legal orders. The new 
attitude was confirmed even in judicial reference procedure, when the 
 
29 The counter-limits doctrine was first affirmed in Corte costituzionale 27 December 
1965 no 98, Giurisprudenza costituzionale, 1322 (1965) and was confirmed in several others 
(such as Corte costituzionale 28 November 1973 no 173, Giurisprudenza costituzionale, I, 2401 
(1973); Corte costituzionale 5 June 1984 no 170, Giurisprudenza costituzionale, I, 1098 (1984) 
and Corte costituzionale 21 April 1989 no 232, Giustizia civile, I, 315 (1990)). 
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Constitutional Court, in ordinanza 18 July 2013 no 207, overruled its previous 
judgments on the point and accepted to make a reference for preliminary 
ruling. 
The evolution of the Constitutional Court’s case law and its cooperative 
attitude has helped to overcome the practical problems that arose regarding 
the relationship between EU law and the national Constitution. When 
dealing with the system of judicial review, however, European integration 
has indisputably led not only to the establishment of a competitor of the 
Constitutional Court, in terms of its power to review national legislation 
through the de facto review operated in interpreting EU law, but also – and 
especially – to the creation of a decentralized system in which national 
ordinary courts are empowered to review even primary legislation, and – 
where appropriate – declare it incompatible with EU law and thus refuse to 
apply it. The impact of this power on the system of constitutional 
adjudication is clear, and becomes even more so if it is considered that to 
date, no safeguard for the Constitutional Court’s role in the legal system has 
been established, unlike the question prioritaire de constitutionnalité that 
was introduced some years ago in France (the notion of priority referring to 
the ordinary courts’ obligation to raise a question of unconstitutionality 
before proceeding to a review for compatibility with supranational law).30 
 
2. The Huge Transformation of the Concrete Form of Review 
The ability to hear references from ordinary courts has always been by 
far – at least until the last few years – the Constitutional Court’s most 
important competence, because, on the one hand, the vast majority of 
judgments issued defines this type of procedure and, on the other, most of 
the major constitutional case law had been decided pursuant to such 
references. Until ten years ago, references were the source of over eighty per 
cent of judgments and in some years were accountable for over ninety per 
cent.31 The Court delivers averagely four hundred/five hundred judgments 
every year, which means that at least three hundred judgments (but often 
more than four hundred) would reach the Court through references, while 
the other competences of the Court did not exceed, altogether, a hundred 
judgments per year. 
In the early two-thousands, the situation changed dramatically. References 
decreased, along with the judgments to which they gave rise, whereas 
 
30 See Art 61-1 of the French Constitution, introduced by the 2008 reform and Ordinance 
no 58-1067, as amended by Organic Law no 2009-1523, on the implementation of Art 61-1 of 
the Constitution. 
31 See P. Passaglia, ‘Les âges du contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois par voie 
d’exception en Italie’, in L. Gay ed, La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité. Approche de 
droit comparé (Brussel: Bruylant, 2014), 573, and statistical reports at 699. 
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conflicts increased, especially between the central State and the Regions. In 
2012, for the first time in the Constitutional Court’s history, the judgments 
originating from references accounted for less than half of the total amount, 
not even reaching forty-five per cent: concrete review had been overtaken by 
abstract review.32 The same occurred in 2013, while over the next two years, 
concrete review regained momentum, again exceeding the share of fifty per 
cent of total judgments. In absolute numbers, however, there have been little 
changes, due to the overall decrease in the judgments delivered by the Court: 
this fell from three hundred twenty-six in 2013 to two hundred and seventy-
six in 2015.33 
Only a few years ago, these results would have been simply inconceivable. 
Analysis of the recent evolution is, of course, crucial when dealing with 
the transformation of the model of Italian constitutional justice. And once 
the increasing number of conflicts has been explained, the core question is to 
understand the reason why judicial references have been decreasing. 
 
a) A New Role for Judges 
As outlined above, with specific regard to the concrete review, the 
structure of the system of judicial review has been dramatically evolving in 
relation to the type of interaction established with ordinary courts. One of 
the reasons that led to the establishment of the Constitutional Court was that 
ordinary courts were not considered sufficiently responsive to the new 
constitutional values. Since the entry into force of the Constitution, the 
situation has changed significantly: the Constitution has been recognized as 
the foundation of the legal system; constitutional provisions have proven to 
be effective in shaping a new civil society; and legal education has considered 
constitutional law to be a key field of study. All these factors have resulted in 
judges adopting a different approach to the Constitution: they have increasingly 
chosen to apply it directly, considering it a law and not only a political 
document that requires legislative implementation. 
This different approach to the Constitution seems to be rather closely 
related to the growing awareness of the complexity of contemporary societies. 
A complexity that has set a new balance in the relations between enacted law 
and case law: indeed, the idea that it is possible to meet any social need 
through legislation, as the most appropriate way to ensure equality and 
justice, is no longer defendable. Contemporary societies’ complexity, in fact, 
requires specific regulations rather than general rules, since every case 
appears to be different from another. In other words, the best solution for a 
 
32 Ibid 592 and statistical report at 712. 
33 See the statistical report: Court’s Research Department, Giurisprudenza costituzionale 
dell’anno 2015. Dati quantitativi e di analisi, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/ 
interventi_presidente/Dati_2015.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016). 
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case is that which enables consideration of the individual situation in as 
much detail and as precisely as possible. If every case is different from 
another, there is no general rule that can even aspire to take all possible 
variables into account without creating the risk of hyper-regulation, which 
would have the consequence of requiring judges to apply provisions that 
may be logical in theory, but, once applied to a specific case, could lead to a 
situation where the summum jus is equivalent to summa iniuria. 
These considerations formed the basis for a new conception of enacted 
law; although this was never recognized as an official doctrine, it nevertheless 
greatly influenced legislation and case law in practice. 
Pursuant to this doctrine, enacted law must be flexible, in the sense that 
it should be limited to the expression of principles and general rules. As a 
result, also the judiciary’s role should change, since it should be for the judge 
to apply those principles and general rules and deliver a decision that takes 
all the elements of individual cases into account, to reach a solution that 
matches Justice as much as possible.34 
The increasing consideration for the role played by ordinary courts 
formed the basis for a new role for judges. In Italy, as in many other civil law 
countries, the influence of the French model resulted in a downgrading of 
the role of judges, who were supposed to be nothing more than ‘the mouth 
that pronounces the words of the (enacted) law, inanimate beings who can 
moderate neither its force nor its rigour’.35 The end of the utopian conception 
of the law as the expression of rationality, and the need to do justice on a case-
by-case basis, gave judges a pivotal role in ensuring a new approach to the law, 
freeing them from strict deference to the will of legislatures. 
This evolving attitude towards enacted law has created the conditions 
for major changes to occur in the dialogue between the Constitutional Court 
and ordinary courts, the latter having been authorized to frequently set aside 
the duty to refer to the former. 
 
b) The Legislative Interpretation as an Increasingly Viable 
Alternative to Reference 
One of the most powerful demonstrations of the cooperation established 
between the Constitutional and ordinary courts over the years concerns 
legislative interpretation. The time when conflicts between the Constitutional 
Court and the Court of Cassation as to which of the two authorities had the 
 
34 The doctrine was expressed, in the nineteen-nineties, by Gustavo Zagrebelsky, and thus 
it probably (greatly) influenced the Constitutional Court’s case law while Zagrebelsky was a 
member of the Court (as well as in the aftermath of his mandate). See G. Zagrebelsky, Il diritto 
mite. Leggi, diritto, giustizia (Torino: Einaudi, 1992). 
35 See Ch.-L. de Secondat Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois (Paris: Chatelain, 1748), Book 
XI, Chapter VI. 
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final word over legislative interpretation is long past. In the 1960s, those 
conflicts had led to the so-called war between the Courts, that eventually 
ended with the courts mutually recognizing their respective responsibilities. 
Today, the Constitutional Court is acknowledged as the supreme interpreter 
of the Constitution, and the Court of Cassation as the supreme interpreter of 
legislation.36 Since then, the Constitutional Court defers to the Cassation’s 
interpretation of laws, claiming only the power to strike down legislation or, 
at most, proposing its own interpretation of primary legislation when there 
is no consolidated interpretation. This is the living law doctrine, an expression 
that may recall Roscoe Pound’s distinction between the law in books and the 
law in action,37 the latter being – in the Italian adaptation – the law as it 
lives, ie the law resulting from the way in which a text (the legal provision) is 
interpreted. By accepting this doctrine, the Constitutional Court bound itself 
to accepting the consolidated interpretation of a provision; thus, the Court 
cannot override an interpretation that is generally adopted by ordinary 
courts.38 
Over the years, the Constitutional Court itself became the forerunner of 
a new role for ordinary courts in the context of constitutional review, by 
encouraging a new approach to legislative provisions, based on the expansion 
of judicial means of interpretation. In Corte costituzionale 22 October 1996 
no 356, the Court expressed the new approach with words that would later 
be repeated continuously:  
‘(i)n principle, legislative acts are not declared unconstitutional 
because it is possible to interpret them so as to render them 
unconstitutional (and there are courts willing to apply such an 
interpretation), but because it is impossible to interpret them so as to 
render them constitutional’.  
This led to constitutional case law that required ordinary courts to 
refrain from submitting a reference to the Constitutional Court until they 
had examined – and excluded – the possibility of interpreting the provision 
 
36 On this subject, see G. Campanelli, Incontri e scontri tra Corte suprema e Corte 
costituzionale in Italia e in Spagna (Torino: Giappichelli, 2005), 217. 
37 R. Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ American Law Review, 12 (1910). 
38 For Italian scholars, the living law doctrine is one of the most important research 
topics. See, ex plurimis, A. Pugiotto, Sindacato di costituzionalità e «diritto vivente» (Milano: 
Giuffrè, 1994); V. Marinelli, Studi sul diritto vivente (Napoli: Jovene, 2008); E. Resta, Diritto 
vivente (Bari-Roma: Laterza, 2008); M. Cavino, Esperienze di diritto vivente. La giurisprudenza 
negli ordinamenti di diritto legislativo (Milano: Giuffrè, 2009), I; M. Cavino, ‘Diritto vivente’ 
Digesto delle discipline pubblicistiche – Aggiornamento (Torino: UTET, 2010), 134; A.S. Bruno 
and M. Cavino, Esperienze di diritto vivente. La giurisprudenza negli ordinamenti di diritto 
legislativo, II (Milano: Giuffrè, 2011); for a greater focus on case law, see, recently, L. Salvato, 
Profili del «diritto vivente» nella giurisprudenza costituzionale, available at www.cortecostituzio 
nale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/stu_276.pdf (last visited 6 December 2016). 
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at issue so as to render it constitutional.39 A third condition for the 
submission of a judicial reference to the Constitutional Court was thus 
introduced by means of case law: in addition to rilevanza and non manifesta 
infondatezza, established, respectively, by Art 1 of legge costituzionale 9 
February 1948 no 1 and Art 23 of legge 11 March 1953 no 87, now ordinary 
courts must first examine the possibility of making the legislative provision 
consistent with the Constitution by means of interpretation.40 Indeed, it is a 
well-established doctrine that the Constitutional Court will not decide on the 
merits of a case unless the referring court has documented the need for the 
reference due to the inefficiency of interpretation alone. 
From a comparative point of view, the new condition may call to mind 
the UK Human Rights Act 1998, s 3(1) on the interpretation of legislation. 
This could be redrafted as follows to adapt it to the Italian situation: ‘(s)o far 
as it is possible to do so, primary legislation (…) must be read and given 
effect in a way which is compatible with the (Constitution)’. To continue the 
comparison between the UK system and judicial reference in Italy, s 4(2) of 
the Human Rights Act could be redrafted as follows: ‘(i)f the court is satisfied 
that the provision is incompatible with (the Constitution), it may make a 
declaration of that incompatibility’. However, the similarities with the 
United Kingdom end there, since a British declaration of incompatibility 
leads (or at least should lead) to political decisions to amend the legislation 
in question, whereas Italian declarations give rise to a review for 
constitutionality. To sum up, while in a weak form of judicial review, as that 
established in the UK, a declaration of incompatibility is a substitute for a 
decision of unconstitutionality, in a strong form of judicial review, such as 
 
39 The importance of the subject is demonstrated by the sheer number of works on it. See, 
among many others, G. Sorrenti, L’interpretazione conforme a Costituzione (Milano: Giuffrè, 
2006); P. Femia, Interpretazione a fini applicativi e legittimità costituzionale (Napoli: Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane, 2006); R. Romboli, ‘Qualcosa di nuovo … anzi d’antico: la contesa 
sull’interpretazione conforme della legge’, in P. Carnevale and C. Colapietro eds, La giustizia 
costituzionale fra memoria e prospettive n 7 above, 89; M. D’Amico and B. Randazzo, 
Interpretazione conforme e tecniche argomentative (Torino: Giappichelli, 2009); F. Amirante et 
al, Corte costituzionale, giudici comuni e interpretazioni adeguatrici (Milano: Giuffrè 2010); A. 
Ciervo, Saggio sull’interpretazione adeguatrice (Roma: Aracne, 2011); F. Mannella, Giudici 
comuni e applicazione della Costituzione (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2011); E. Lamarque, 
Corte costituzionale e giudici nell’Italia repubblicana (Bari-Roma: Laterza, 2012); G. Laneve, La 
giustizia costituzionale nel sistema dei poteri, Vol I, Interpretazione e giustizia costituzionale: 
profili ricostruttivi (Bari: Cacucci, 2014); M. Ruotolo, Interpretare: nel segno della Costituzione 
(Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2014); F. Modugno, ‘Al fondo della teoria dell’ “interpretazione 
conforme alla Costituzione” ’ Diritto e società, 461 (2015). 
40 The question should arise on the compatibility of the new condition and the non 
manifesta infondatezza, since when the Constitutional Court requires ordinary courts to state 
that it is impossible to give the provision a constitutional interpretation, it can be hardly 
maintained that to the condition for submitting a question to constitutional review is only a 
lack of certainty as to the provision’s consistency with the Constitution. 
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that in Italy, declarations of incompatibility are the prerequisite for a decision 
of unconstitutionality.41 
This conclusion should not be limited to judicial references and concrete 
review of legislation. As a matter of fact, in abstract review too, the idea that 
a decision of unconstitutionality is the last resort is well-entrenched. This is 
demonstrated by the rather high number of interpretative dismissals issued 
by the Court, ie decisions in which the Constitutional Court does not declare 
a provision unconstitutional but rather offers an interpretation itself, one 
that makes the provision compatible with the Constitution: originally, this 
type of decision was used only in concrete review, where it is conceived as a 
normal form of dialogue between the Constitutional Court and the referring 
court on how to provide a constitutionally compatible interpretation of a 
provision. In recent years, the usage of interpretative decisions has also 
become rather frequent in disputes between the central State and the Regions 
concerning legislation; therefore, in abstract review too, the Constitutional 
Court is entitled to experiment with interpretations that seek to achieve 
consistency with the Constitution. 
Only in the event that the experiment fails, the Court comes to decide 
whether there are grounds for a declaration of unconstitutionality. Reference 
to a Latin maxim warns against extremity in dealing with the validity of legal 
acts: utile per inutile non vitiatur, meaning that the useful must not be 
vitiated by the useless. 
This reference helps remarkably in understanding the approach adopted 
by the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, a question remains: to what extent 
can legislative interpretation be an alternative to a reference? In other words, 
how far can the judge go in interpreting a legislative provision so as to make 
it consistent with the Constitution? 
The answer is far from obvious. At a first glance, a literal approach may 
help, assuming that a judge is to restrain himself or herself and interpret the 
provision in accordance with the meaning of the words that he or she reads. 
This common-sense conclusion, however, is only apparently indisputable. 
As a matter of fact, in Italy, rules of interpretation are not rigidly stated. Thus, 
the literal approach is only one of many approaches from which the judge 
can choose: if it is reasonable to deem that the provisions’ formulation is to 
always be the starting point in interpretation, judges are not prevented from 
departing from strict deference to the words, to take into account the true 
intention of the legislature or even societal evolution and changes in the 
broader legal order. 
Ultimately, it is not possible to establish a clear rule; therefore, when it 
comes to the limits of constitutionally oriented interpretation, it is for the 
 
41 For the opposition between weak and strong forms of judicial review, see M.V. Tushnet, 
Weak Courts, Strong Rights n 13 above. 
2016]      Centralized System and Decentralized Guardians of the Constitution     428 
         
judge to decide whether a departure from the literal approach is or is not 
reasonable. In this regard, the Constitutional Court itself, despite some 
swaying over the years, appears to have reached a conclusion that calls upon 
judges and their prudence. A recent judgment is rather explicit in upholding 
the idea that the Court asks judges to display both their legal skills and their 
reasonableness in deciding whether to interpret (the provision consistently 
with the Constitution) or to refer (the question of constitutionality to the 
Constitutional Court):  
‘(t)he obligation to come to an interpretation consistent with the 
Constitution gives way to the incidental question of constitutionality 
whenever the said interpretation is inconsistent with the wording of the 
provision and proves to be quite eccentric and bizarre, especially in light 
of the context in which the provision is placed’; ‘interpretation according 
to the Constitution is a duty and has unquestionable priority over any 
other (…), nonetheless it belongs to the family of exegetical approaches 
– available to the judge when he/she exercises the judicial function – 
having declaratory nature’;  
‘(t)herefore, when, by means of these approaches, it is impossible to 
derive, from the words of the provisions, any interpretation consistent 
with the Constitution, the judge is required to refer the question of 
constitutionality to the (Constitutional) Court’.42 
c) The Entrenchment of the Constitution and Its Impact on 
the Reference Proceeding 
As described above, the constitutional case law of the last two decades 
has strengthened ordinary courts’ powers, reserving for the Constitutional 
Court only those matters that cannot be solved by ordinary judicial 
interpretation. 
The new approach to judicial legislative interpretation can be easily 
connected to the rising awareness that a Constitution is above all a source of 
law, no matter how peculiar it may be and no matter how important its 
political dimension. Also, a Constitution conceived as a source of law must 
be treated as a source of law, just like any other. After all, this is nothing 
more than an application of Chief Justice Marshall’s legacy, which was to see 
the very essence of judicial duty in deciding on the operation of each of the 
conflicting laws, the Constitution being one of them:  
‘if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so 
that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
 
42 See Corte costituzionale 19 February 2016 no 36, Foro amministrativo, 530 (2016). 
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disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, 
disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these 
conflicting rules governs the case’.43 
Thus, also the interplay between the Constitutional Court and ordinary 
courts is influenced by the growing need to make the Constitution the 
cornerstone of the entire legal system. Paradoxically, the way to pursue this 
objective requires a diminution of the factual importance precisely of the 
first guardian of the Constitution: the more the Constitution is perceived as a 
law that differs from others only because of its supremacy, the less is the 
Constitutional Court needed to assess this supremacy; the more widely is the 
Constitution applied (especially to influence legislative interpretation), the 
less must the Constitutional Court apply it (especially to react against 
infringements by legislative acts). 
 
 
V. Centralized vs Decentralized Systems: Is It Time to Reconsider 
the Alternative? A Few Concluding Remarks  
The evolving concept and strength of the Constitution have produced 
changes in the system of constitutional justice, and it is reasonable to expect, 
in the near future, a strengthening of the trends described above. 
With regard to abstract review, it is likely to remain a significant part of 
the Constitutional Court’s docket. It may also be improved with other ways 
to access the Court. For example, reforms could focus on constitutional 
review of parliamentary elections, or could grant the parliamentary opposition 
the power to submit questions of constitutionality, so that legislative acts 
that would be difficult to refer to the Constitutional Court could be brought 
before it, thanks to the dissenting minority of Parliament. These reforms, 
associated with others, would create a more perfect system, thus empowering 
the guardian of the Constitution to accomplish its tasks even in areas where 
currently a lack of protection can be observed. 
Setting aside possible constitutional and legislative reforms, the core 
issue for the judicial review of legislation still appears to be the concrete 
form of review. 
The development of constitutionally oriented legislative interpretation 
reduced the number of judicial references to the Constitutional Court. It is 
worth asking whether this process has gone too far, whether the Court 
designed for itself a role that is now becoming excessively marginal. In other 
words, the question is whether a centralized system of constitutional review 
can tolerate the importance that the Constitutional Court has granted to 
 
43 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803). 
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ordinary courts.44 A negative answer would lead to calls for an overruling in 
constitutional case law, to force ordinary courts to submit constitutional 
questions as soon as a doubt of constitutionality arises: this would mean 
reverting to the original distribution of responsibilities between the 
Constitutional Court and ordinary courts, the distribution suggested by the 
constitutional and legislative provisions that regulate constitutional justice 
through the condition of non manifesta infondatezza. 
However, ultimately, this point of view would amount to nothing more 
than turning back time. Thus the question is whether the Constitutional 
Court and the legal system as a whole can ignore the fact that Constitution 
has deeply penetrated society and the courtrooms, to the point that the 
system of constitutional justice as conceived many decades ago no longer 
suits present needs. Indeed, such a change in the conception of the Constitution 
has occurred that perhaps the Constitutional Court’s guidance in implementing 
the Constitution is no longer needed; or rather, is needed only infrequently, 
and not constantly, as it had been in the past. As a result, instead of trying to 
revitalize judicial references to the Constitutional Court, the core of the 
problem could be addressed by accepting the fact that since constitutional 
consciousness has grown up, the reference proceeding has begun to grow 
old. 
Maybe, the time has come to think of the Italian system of constitutional 
review form a different point of view. When the Constitution was adopted, 
the establishment of special proceedings to review primary legislation was 
necessary to effectively guarantee the Supreme Law; and such a purpose 
fully justified the introduction of a double-track form of protection that, 
from the ordinary courts’ perspective, could be seen as unnatural, since it 
implied – for the court before which the case was brought – the deprivation 
of the power to decide it fully. From a more general perspective, rather than 
depriving ordinary courts of power, this double-track protection was the 
means to achieve more efficient protection. 
Currently, due only to the entrenchment of the Constitution, ordinary 
courts no longer appear inadequate to protect the Constitution. Ultimately, 
the real argument in favour of a centralized form of concrete review lies in 
the Constitutional Court’s power to strike down legislation, a power that is 
supposed to ensure legal certainty better than any declaration delivered by 
ordinary courts, which are subject to reversal or overruling. 
 
44 For the analysis of the evolution towards a decentralized model, see E. Malfatti, R. 
Romboli et al, Il giudizio sulle leggi e la sua “diffusione” n 20 above; A.M. Nico, L’accentramento 
e la diffusione nel giudizio sulle leggi (Torino: Giappichelli, 2007). I began to address the issue 
in a previous work in English: see P. Passaglia, ‘The Italian System of Constitutional Review: A 
Kelsenian Model Moving Towards a Decentralized Model?’, in J. Bell and M.-L. Paris eds, Rights-
Based Constitutional Review: Constitutional Courts in a Changing Landscape (Camberley 
Surrey: Edward Elgar, 2016), 247. 
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In a civil law country as is Italy, the absence of a doctrine of precedent 
traditionally undermines any attempt to establish legal certainty focusing on 
case law. Nevertheless, in recent decades, the idea that the system works as if 
a doctrine of precedent (albeit not binding) did exist has gained momentum,45 
to the point that the very notion of legal certainty has dramatically changed, 
and the Constitutional Court’s46 function as negative legislator is only part 
of the solution: as shown by the abovementioned living law doctrine, it is 
impossible to dissociate the words of the provision from its interpretation. 
Therefore, certainty is no longer the result of enacted law alone. To gain 
knowledge of the law, reading acts of Parliament is only a part of the activity 
required, because it is also necessary to engage in a thorough analysis of case 
law. In other words, legal certainty is the result of both clear enacted law 
(and thus, among other things, of the removal of legislative provisions that are 
inconsistent with the Constitution) and of a relatively predictable case law. 
If – the absence of a doctrine of precedent notwithstanding – Italian 
case law can be considered sufficiently predictable,47 it may be possible to 
reconsider the alternative between centralized and decentralized forms of 
concrete review. This does not necessarily mean that the Italian system of 
judicial review should or could be subverted to introduce a wholly decentralized 
system. If such a reform appears to be very difficult to accomplish (and 
perhaps also to conceive), a humbler but no less significant achievement 
could be the genuine recognition of constitutionally oriented interpretation 
by ordinary courts as a full form of constitutional adjudication, equal in rank 
to the Constitutional Court’s concrete review. This recognition may act as the 
ultimate enshrinement of the notion that the Constitution is a legal act to be 
applied whenever possible, for the simple reason that it is the Supreme Law 
of the Land and that its observance is the foremost and essential duty of all. 
 
 
45 See, in particular, A. Pizzorusso, ‘Fonti del diritto – Disposizioni sulla legge in generale 
art. 1-9’, in A. Scialoja and G. Branca eds, Commentario del Codice civile (Bologna: Zanichelli-
Il Foro italiano, 2nd ed, 2011), 705. 
46 The notion of negative legislator, referred to Constitutional Courts, was developed by 
Kelsen himself (see H. Kelsen, ‘La Garantie juridictionnelle de la constitution (La Justice 
constitutionnelle)’ n 8 above) to emphasize the role of Courts, which do not make law but only 
strike down legislation that is inconsistent with a higher law. As a matter of fact, currently such 
a definition could be confirmed with difficulty, if anything because the Court has granted itself 
the power not only to strike down provisions, but also individual words or expressions in the 
text of a provision. In this case, by erasing part of the text but not the provision itself, the Court 
changes the contents of the provision. The distance from the idea of negative legislator is even 
greater when the Court declares a legislative provision to be unconstitutional for what it fails to 
contain, and thus adds a part to its contents to make the provision consistent with the 
Constitution. 
47 With regard to the impact of precedents on Italian case law, see, in English, M. Taruffo 
and M. La Torre, ‘Precedent in Italy’, in D.N. MacCormick and R.S. Summers eds, Interpreting 
Precedents: A Comparative Study (Farnham: Ashgate Dartmouth, 1997), 141. 
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